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A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE 
CONFLICT OF ISRAEL AND 
PALESTINE: WHERE WE ARE NOW 
AND WHERE WE CAN GO 
ORANEET OREVI∗ 
OVERVIEW 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has spanned over six decades, resulting in 
brutal deaths of civilians, assassinations of political figures, and 
casualties of countless soldiers on both sides. Dominant discourse on the 
conflict focuses largely on the prevalence of violence and State-figures’ 
failure to properly address the issue. This paper will take a different 
approach by exploring the legality under International Law of the 
continual expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and by 
illuminating the peacebuilding efforts of grassroots organizations 
focused on education, uniting communities, and engaging international 
actors. A discussion of the history is important not only to inform present 
context, but also to impart wisdom and lessons from our past that may 
inform our present and future. However, there is only so much criticism a 
conflict can undergo before it becomes destructive and staggering. While 
Part One focuses on the settlements, Part Two moves beyond the focus 
of a critical eye on the conflict toward an emphasis on education and 
peacebuilding efforts activists have taken to promote a holistic approach 
to achieving a lasting and just peace.  
  
 ∗ J.D., May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law. My deepest gratitude and special 
thanks to Cara B. Hughes for her editing expertise and for challenging me to think critically about 
conflicts, to be a more effective social justice activist, and to believe in myself. 
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In light of this paper’s topic on settlements and non-violence, it is 
important for me to acknowledge and address that I am an Israeli-
American living in the United States. I have the privilege of not 
experiencing the conflict on a daily basis contrary to that of my family 
living in Israel, the Palestinians living in Palestine,1 and the Palestinian 
citizens living within the borders of Israel. Finally, during the most 
recent peak of violence in Palestine and Israel between Hamas and the 
Israeli government, it is imperative to recognize the suffering of both 
Palestinians and Israelis subjected to the violence and demand that it 
stop. This article is dedicated to them. 
PART ONE – AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS AND 
EXPANSION OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS AND ITS EFFECTS 
IN THE WEST BANK UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW – LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Israeli government has authorized the continuing construction of 
residential dwellings in the West Bank area of what will eventually be 
part of the Palestinian state.2 With Israel’s expansion efforts has come 
destruction of property and transfer of populations.3 While Israel 
maintains that the construction and expansion of settlements is a legal 
exercise of its sovereign right,4 Palestinian officials sees it as an obstacle 
to peace that undermines a two-state solution and the Palestinian right to 
self-determination.5 Furthermore, the international community views the 
Israeli settlement policies as violations of international law.6 Section I 
will explore the legitimacy of Israeli actions in pursuing the settlement 
  
 1. For the purposes of this article and to further contextualize this paper, the West Bank and 
Gaza (or what is slated to be the future Palestinian State) will be referred to as Palestine. 
 2  Joel Greenberg, After U.N. vote, Netanyahu authorizes new building in settlements, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (November 30, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-
30/world/35585851_1_maaleh-adumim-israeli-construction-denunciations-from-palestinian-
officials. (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 3. Aid agencies call for immediate end to demolitions and settlement expansion as Israel 
displaces Palestinians acrossthe West Bank, THE UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SYSTEM ON THE 
QUESTION OF PALESTINE (UNISPAL)(May 1, 2013), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/ 
998B72485D85EBD385257B5E004DF3F8. (last visited May 25, 2013). 
 4. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/FAQ/Pages/ 
FAQ_Peace_process _with_Palestinians_Dec_2009.aspx#Settlements. (last visited May 25, 2013). 
 5. Palestinian official: Israeli settlements are main obstacle to peace, MIDDLE EAST 
MONITOR (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/6079-palestinian-official-israeli-settlements-
are-main-obstacle-to-peace-. (last visited May 25, 3013).  
 6. Yuval Ginbar, Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories as a Violation of Human 
Rights: Legal and Conceptual Aspects 25 B’TSELEM (Yael Stein March 1997), available at 
http://www1.idc.ac.il:549/2004/ 13009.pdf. 
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policies in light of obligations under International Humanitarian Law – 
Laws of Armed Conflict (IHL-LOAC).  
Section II will examine the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
illuminate how Israel came to be an Occupying Power. It will show how 
Israel’s policies regarding the settlements in the West Bank, as well as 
Israel’s actions to accommodate construction and implementation of the 
settlements, are inconsistent with Israel’s obligations as an Occupying 
Power delineated in the Fourth Geneva Convention (4GC) and Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Convention (P1AGC). Section III will show 
how the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict could be characterized as an 
international armed conflict in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes (CARs) in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination.  Part IV concludes that Israel 
is in violation of International Humanitarian Law for its expansionist 
efforts and continued construction of Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank. 
II. ISRAEL AS AN OCCUPYING POWER THAT VIOLATES ITS 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW – LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT. 
A. HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND 
THE ARMED CONFLICT THAT LED TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE 
WEST BANK 
In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly proposed 
Resolution 181 to recommend a Partition Plan for two separate states in 
British-Mandated Palestine: a Jewish State and a Palestinian State.7 The 
surrounding Arab nations and Palestinian Arabs rejected the 
recommendation and refused to adopt Resolution 181.8 However, the 
Jews accepted the recommendation and proceeded to establish the Jewish 
State of Israel on14 May 1948.9 The United Nations accepted the 
proclamation of the State of Israel, despite the fact that the newly 
founded state “was established on a more extensive territory than 
recommended in the partition plan.”10 As a result of the establishment of 
Israel, five Arab armies attacked Israel, including Transjordan (now 
  
 7. Nicholas Rostow, The Historical and Legal Contexts of Israel’s Borders, 77, JERUSALEM 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, available at http://www.jcpa.org/text/israel-rights/kiyum-rostow.pdf 
 8. PUBLIC BROADCAST STATION, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (December 
2001),  http://www.pbs.org/pov/pdf/promiese/promises-timeline.pdf. (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Sara Yarden, The Right to Self Determination, DIAKONIA (26 August 2009), 
http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=3142. (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (noting that Israel 
included some of the territories that were to be reserved for the Palestinian Mandate). 
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Jordan), Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.11 After the hostilities 
ended, Israel signed four Armistice Agreements to institute a ceasefire 
with Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.12 The Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, signed on 3 April 
1949, established demarcation lines between Israeli and Jordanian forces; 
the borders came to be known as the Green Line.13 
The borders of the Armistice Agreement indicated that the West Bank 
remained under the control of Jordanian occupation and were intended to 
be temporary until a final peace settlement could be reached.14 On 25 
April 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank, declaring the West Bank as 
sovereign Jordanian territory and offering Jordanian citizenship to the 
Palestinian residents of the West Bank.15 However, Jordanian assertion of 
State sovereignty over the West Bank was pronounced illegal by the 
international community and was recognized by only two states, the 
United Kingdom and Pakistan.16 
On 5 June 1967, Israel executed a pre-emptive strike on Egypt that 
ultimately drew Jordan and Syria into a regional war17 known as the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War.18 By the end of the war, Israel took control of the West 
Bank and other territories outside of the agreed upon Israeli borders in 
the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement.19 In doing so, Israel took control 
overland that had been previously mandated as the Palestinian homeland. 
While the international community considers the West Bank occupied by 
Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel insists that its control of the 
West Bank does not make it an “occupied territory,” but rather a 
“disputed territory.”20 
  
 11. Rostow, supra note 7, at 78. 
 12. UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL, HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM-ISRAEL ARMISTICE 
AGREEMENT (DOCUMENT S/1302/REV.1 1/ 3 April 1949), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F03D55E48F77 AB698525643B00608D34.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. PHILLIP ROBINS, HISTORY OF JORDAN 73 (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
 16. Three Myths About the ‘Occupation,’ JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, available 
at http://jcpa.org/text/occupation _responses.pdf. 
 17. Key Maps, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel 
_palestinians/maps/html/six_day_war.stm. (last visited May 28, 2013). 
 18. PUBLIC BROADCAST STATION, supra note 8, at 3. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War is known as 
The Six Day War to Israelis and as al-Naksah or “the setback” to Palestinians. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, (May 20, 
2001), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Settlements+ 
and+International+Law.html. (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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B. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES VS. DISPUTED TERRITORIES 
Israel’s interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention forms the basis 
of its contention that the West Bank is not an occupied territory. Article 2 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines occupation as territory that 
includes “all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party by another High Contracting Party.”21 Israel interprets 
this applicable provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention to mean that a 
territory only becomes occupied when a High Contracting Party that is a 
signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention conquers territory of another 
High Contracting Party that is a signatory to the same. Thus, Israel 
maintains that because the West Bank was not under the sovereign 
control of any State before 1967, the West Bank could not be considered 
“occupied” when Israel seized control in the 1967 War. 
On the other hand, the United Nations (UN) is unpersuaded that the 
application of the laws relating to occupation or “belligerent occupation” 
is contingent upon sovereign control of a territory. The UN has 
consistently referred to the territories won by Israel after the 1967 War as 
“occupied territories.”22 An interpretation of occupation that does not 
include a sovereign control element has been reinforced in the language 
used by several actors within the international community to refer to the 
conflict. For example, after the 1967 War, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 242 requiring the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces 
from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”23 Another example 
occurred in October 2001, when UN Special Rapporteur, John Durgard, 
stated unequivocally in his report to the I.C.J. that Israel is an Occupying 
Power that is indeed occupying the territories, because Israel has the 
military capacity to exercise control over the West Bank and employs its 
military to do so.24 Furthermore, the UN International Court of Justice 
issued an advisory opinion entitled, “Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” stating,  
At the close of its analysis, the Court notes that the territories 
situated between the Green Line and the former eastern 
boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by 
  
 21. Geneva Convention (IV)Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/380. 
 22. S.C. RES. 242, (22 Nov. 1967), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE7 00686136. (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 4 Annex I to Request for an 
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Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and 
Jordan.  Under customary international law, the Court observes, 
these were therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the 
status of occupying Power. Subsequent events in these territories 
have done nothing to alter this situation. The Court concludes 
that all these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain 
occupied territories and that Israel has continued to have the 
status of occupying Power.25 
The Israeli Supreme Court itself has declared that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention applies to the West Bank – or Judaea and Samaria – and in 
doing so, defined that area as an occupied territory. In the case, 
Jam’iyyat Iskan al-Mu’aliman al-Mahddudat al-Mas’uliyyah, Teacher’s 
Housing Cooperative Society Duly Registered at Judea and Samaria 
Headquarters v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al 
Piskei Din, Justice Aharon Barak wrote, “as regards the obligation of the 
occupying state vis-à-vis the international community, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention are found both in customary international law and 
treaty-based law, to which Israel is [sic] party, and they apply to the 
West Bank.”26 Because the applicable provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention regulate an occupying power that has occupied territory now 
under the High Contracting Power’s control, the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank reveals 
that it considers the West Bank to be an occupied territory. And again, on 
30 May 2004, the Israeli Supreme Court, High Court of Justice, 
referenced in the case Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of 
Israel, that “Israel has been holding the areas of [the West Bank] in 
belligerent occupation” since 1967.27 
Indeed, Israel’s own Foreign Minister’s legal counsel, Theodore Meron, 
“noted with embarrassment, Israel itself had recognized the status of the 
West Bank as an occupied territory by publishing military decrees 
declaring explicitly that it could respect the Geneva Conventions.”28 
Nevertheless, the Israeli government maintains the territories are not 
occupied and the United Nations’ interpretation is not determinative of 
  
 25. Summary of the Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (emphasis added), INTERNATIONAL COURT JUSTICE (9 July 2004), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf. 
 26. Ginbar, supra note 6, at 6.  
 27. Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, High Court of Justice 2056/04, 
Israel: Supreme Court, 30 May 2004, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020 
/a28/04020560.a28.pdf. 
 28. TOM SEGEV, 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR, AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE 
EAST 576 (Metropolitan Books 2005). (emphasis added). 
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the issue. However, it is my position that Israel is an Occupying Power, 
because the Israeli conquest of land reserved for a Palestinian State 
establishes an occupation. Therefore, the following sub-sections of Part 
II explore the applicability of international humanitarian laws to the 
armed conflict as it pertains to Israel’s obligations as an Occupying 
Power of the West Bank.  
C. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND 
APPLICATION OF IHL-LOAC OBLIGATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN 
OCCUPYING POWER 
Assuming the UN Security Council’s position is correct that Israel is 
occupying the West Bank, then the conflict could be classified as a 
Common Article 2 traditional state v. state international armed conflict in 
which the Hague Convention, Four Geneva Conventions, and both 
Additional Protocols apply. However, if Israel’s position that the 
territories are not occupied is assumed, then the conflict could be 
classified as one of the following: an international armed conflict under 
CARs (colonial domination, alien occupation, racist regime, self 
determination), a Common Article 3 non-international internal armed 
conflict, or a Common Article 3 Non-international armed conflict. This 
section will examine the first two potential classifications in turn, 
because they are the most applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
1. STATE VERSUS STATE INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
In order for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be characterized as a 
traditional international armed conflict, both parties to the conflict must 
be a State. While it is not contested that Israel established its 
independence in 1948, the question of Palestine achieving statehood is 
more complicated and thus requires further analysis. From an 
international legal standpoint, the achievement of statehood for the 
Palestine Authority (PA) would result in the characterization of a State v. 
State armed conflict. Therefore, if Palestine is recognized as a State, all 
Four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations, and both Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions would apply to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. As a result, the Israeli government and the PA would 
be forced to comply with a larger body of applicable laws of armed 
conflict (listed above) with the exception of those laws that were not 
ratified by the PA or Israel, namely the Hague Regulations and 
Additional Protocols, in which case the application of customary law 
status would have to be established. Statehood can be proven by either: 
1) being a recognized member of the United Nations or 2) by having 
attributes of statehood.  
63
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Palestine has recently been deemed a non-member observer State, but it 
does not enjoy full membership recognition in the UN. In November 
2012, member States of the UN voted on the bid for Palestinian 
statehood. One hundred thirty eight of the 193 States of the UN 
recognized the State of Palestine, not including the United States and 
Israel who opposed the move.29 As a result of the majority vote, the 
United Nations General Assembly “resolution elevate[d] [Palestine’s] 
status from ‘non-member observer entity’ to ‘non-member observer 
state.’”30 As a non-member observer State, Palestine is in the same 
position as The Vatican, for instance, but like it, Palestine cannot vote on 
any resolutions. It is notable that when the former republic of Yugoslavia 
was broken up into six separate States, recognition only required the 
formal acknowledgement by one other UN member State.31 Therefore, 
some may argue that the 138 votes were sufficient to establish 
Palestinian statehood.  
However, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
the United States, opposed the bid and would likely respond accordingly 
if the matter were brought to the Security Council.32 Because observer 
status does not require Security Council approval, Palestine has still not 
received full membership recognition in the United Nations.33 
Accordingly, there are contradicting views as to whether non-member 
observer State status accords statehood to Palestine. Therefore, it is 
necessary to conduct an additional analysis of Palestine’s statehood 
under a different set of criteria - the attributes of statehood as set out in 
the Montevideo Convention. To establish that Palestine has become a de 
facto State, the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties 
of States (hereinafter the Montevideo Convention) sets out the traditional 
criteria for (and attributes of) statehood including: 1) a permanent 
population 2) defined territory 3) government and 4) the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states.34 
  
 29. Louis Charbonneau, Palestinians Win Implicit U.N. Recognition of Sovereign State, 
REUTERS (November 29, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-palestinians-
statehood-idUSBRE8AR0EG20121129. (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 30. David Ariosto, Michael Pearson, U.N. Approves Palestinian ‘observer state’ bid, CNN 
(November 30, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/29/world/meast/palestinian-united-nations. (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 31. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 315 (Louis H. 
Higgins 2001). 
 32. But cf. infra text accompanying note 53. 
 33. Ariosto, supra note 30. 
 34. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), 165 L.N.T.S. 19 
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Before delving into the substantive analysis of statehood, an explanation 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian 
Authority (PA) is necessary. The PLO was established in 1964 and was 
later “recognized as ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people’ at the 1974 Arab League Summit in Rabat Morocco.”35 The PA 
is a subsidiary agency of the PLO, temporarily “established as a result of 
the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles,” but thus far “remains the 
governing body of the autonomous areas in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip.”36 The temporal aspect of the PA’s control has to do with the fact 
that the PA was created as an interim administrative body until a final 
status negotiation commences. While the PLO conducts foreign relations, 
however, the PA has no foreign relations powers. For purposes of 
avoiding the use of the term “Palestine” in the analysis of statehood for 
Palestine, PLO and PA will be used interchangeably. 
The PA exhibits several attributes of statehood. It is uncontested that the 
PA has a permanent population – Palestinians.37 For example, the Israeli 
human rights organization, B’Tselem, estimated in its 2012 Annual 
Report, that there are approximately 2.5 million Palestinians living in the 
West Bank. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, an estimated 
2,164,311 Palestinians are living in the West Bank as of July 2013.38 
Palestinians have been around since long before the establishment of 
Israel and although there is no specified number requirement for a 
population to be permanent,39 a large number of Palestinians live in the 
occupied territories, identify themselves as Palestinians, and have the 
reproductive capabilities to procreate. Therefore, the PA has a permanent 
population.  
Establishing statehood under the Montevideo Convention also requires 
that the State have a defined territory. As reflected in various resolutions 
and opinions, the UN has formally named the territories controlled by 
Israel the “Occupied Palestinian Territories” (OPT).  For example, UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 demand that Israel withdraw 
from the territories it occupied in the 1967 War, including the West 
  
 35. PLO-PA Comparison Chart, PROCON.ORG, http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view. 
additional-resource.php?resourceID=904. (last visited May 15, 2013).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Iain Scobbie, Alon Margalit, Sarah Hibbin, Recognizing Palestinian Statehood, YALE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, available at http://yalejournal.org/2011/08/recognizing-
palestinian-statehood/. 
 38. Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: Annual Report 2011 3 B’TSELEM, available at 
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/2011_annual_report_eng.pdf; see also The World 
Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/we.html. 
 39. DAMROSCH, supra note 31, at308.   
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Bank, and withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines.40 This demand indicates 
that the territories occupied by Israel during the war constitute the 
territories of the Palestinian State.  
However, according to the agreement between Jordan and Israel, the 
armistice lines were not intended to be final borders. Pursuant to Article 
II(2), the demarcation lines proposed by the agreement were “without 
prejudice to future 
territorial settlements or 
boundary lines or claims 
of either Party related 
thereto.”41 Therefore, 
the Armistice 
Agreement “was not 
intended to be a final 
settlement of border 
disputes, but was a 
provisional measure 
intended to facilitate the 
transition from a truce 
to a future permanent 
peace settlement in the 
region.”42 Nevertheless, 
in 1948 when Israel was 
applying for UN 
membership, U.S. 
representative to the UN 
Security Council, Phillip 
Jessup, argued in favor 
stating, “both reason 
and history demonstrate 
that the concept of 
territory does not 
necessarily include precise delimitation of the boundaries of that 
territory.”43 Subsequently, Israel was recognized as a State. Therefore, 
the lack of exact boundaries did not hinder statehood for Israel. Many 
renowned scholars on the topic support Phillip Jessup’s reasoning, 
asserting that past practice reveals that “the existence of full defined 
  
 40. Scobbie, supra note 37. 
 41. Rostow, supra note 7, at 78. 
 42. Yoav Tadmor, The Palestinian Refugees of 1948: The Right to Compensation and Return, 
411, TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL (Fall 1994), 8 TMPICLJ 403. 
 43. DAMROSCH, supra note 31, at 306. 
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frontiers is not required” to establish a defined territory.44 Thus, although 
it does not follow the traditional criteria for statehood, lack of exact 
boundaries is not fatal to the determination of whether or not Palestine 
has a defined territory.  
The third element of statehood established under the Montevideo 
Convention mandates that there be a government. The PLO can be 
considered a government in that it has been recognized by the 
international community as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
As mentioned above, in 1974, the UN General Assembly (GA) 
recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the official 
representative of the Palestinian people in Resolution 3236.45 Thereafter, 
in Resolution 3237, the GA granted the PLO observer status in the UN, 
which allowed the PLO to have similar rights to other members of the 
UN except for voting on resolutions.46 Also, in 1993, Israel officially 
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in the 
international treaty known as the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. This treaty 
“provided for a transitional period of Palestinian self-rule in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip,”47 in which “Israel ha[d]transferred to 
the PA certain governmental powers and responsibilities.”48 As a result 
of this treaty, the PA has exclusive security and civil control over Area A 
(darker shaded area) and civil control over Area B (lighter shaded area) 
in the map on the previous page.49 Combined, these areas constitute 
27.9% of the West Bank. Area C (not delineated on the map) is wholly 
controlled by Israel.50 
However, the UN Secretary-General has clarified, “where a 
revolutionary government presents itself as representing a State, in 
rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should 
be…whether the new government exercises effective authority within 
  
 44. CHRIS N. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY MAKING 
CAPACITY 88 (Rotterdam University Press 1973), (citing Ian Brownlie, op. cite., p.67).  
 45. G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX) [1974]; 3236 (XXIX) [1974]. 
 46. G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX) [1974], available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/38/IMG/NR073838.pdf?OpenElement. 
 47. Central Intelligence Agency, The World FactBook, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html. 
 48. Scobbie, supra note 37. 
 49. Haim Gvirtzman, Maps of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria Determining the Extent 
of the Additional Withdrawals, BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/maps.htm. (last visited May 1, 2013). 
 50. Id. 
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the territory of the State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the 
population.”51 
While the fact that Israel transferred control to the PA during the Oslo 
Accords maybe significant, the transfer of control was both limited in 
terms of governmental power and scope of territory. For example, while 
“the PA delivers governmental services [to] about 40 percent of the West 
Bank, the remaining 60 percent of the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
[are] controlled by Israel.”52 Because the bulk of the population includes 
large numbers of Palestinians living in Areas B and C who are subject to 
Israeli military rule, the PA does not have effective authority over the 
entire territory of the West Bank. Therefore, there is a strong argument 
that the PA falls short in establishing a government with effective 
authority over its territory.53 
The fourth and final element required to satisfy the Montevideo 
Convention definition of statehood is an established capacity to enter into 
relations with other States. This element is a non-issue, as it is 
uncontested that the PLO has demonstrated and is capable of entering 
into relations with other States, including Israel. The most obvious 
example of course is the seminal 1993 Oslo Accords or Oslo Peace 
Process, in which Israel and the PLO attempted to reach a peace 
agreement.54 Because the PLO has entered into, and has the ability to 
enter into, agreements with members of the United Nations including but 
not limited to Israel, the PLO satisfies this element of statehood.   
Although the PA and the PLO have strong arguments to posit that they 
exhibit the four attributes of statehood, not all of them, namely a 
government with effective control, can be definitively proven to establish 
Palestine as a de facto state. Thus, assuming the PA has not achieved 
  
 51. The rules established in this memo apply to the PA, because this conflict is classified as an 
international armed conflict in self-determination to overthrow an alien occupation, See infra pp. 28-
29. Characterization of the Conflict as an International Armed Conflict under CARs). from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of 
Representation in the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (March 9, 1950), available at  
http://www.historyofmacedonia.org/IndependentMacedonia/UN.html. (last visited May 27, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 52. Scobbie, supra note 37. 
 53. It is interesting to note however, that the United States does not apply the “effective 
authority” analysis when considering if the government prong of the Montevideo Convention has 
been satisfied. Rather, the comment in the Restatement proffers a considerably easier standard: 
“there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in 
international relations” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 cmt. d 
(1987) (emphasis added). Were the United States to apply the Restatement to an evaluation of 
Palestine’s statehood, Palestine would likely meet the criteria for recognition. 
 54. PUBLIC BROADCAST STATION, supra note 8, at 6.  
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statehood, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not be characterized as a 
traditional State v. State armed conflict.  
However, assuming also that the arguments proffered in Section II 
establish that the West Bank is occupied by Israel, Israel’s actions with 
respect to the settlement policies must be consistent with the 
international legal obligations of an Occupying Power. The applicable 
principles of IHL – LOAC that delineate Israel’s obligations as an 
Occupying Power are set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions.  
2. Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
Israel contends that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply de 
jure to the West Bank, because the West Bank is not an occupied 
territory. However, the International Court of Justice held in an advisory 
opinion that: 
[The Geneva Convention] is applicable when two conditions are 
fulfilled: that there exists an armed conflict …; and that the  
conflict has arisen between two contracting parties. If those two 
conditions are satisfied, the Convention applies, in particular, in 
any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the 
contracting parties.55 
Assuming the first condition is satisfied by the arguments set forth in 
Part II regarding establishment of the West Bank as an occupied 
territory, the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to Israel’s actions 
in the West Bank if it can be established that Israel was a contracting 
party.  Israel and Jordan ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on 
June 7, 1951 and May 29, 1951, respectively, thus making them both 
parties to the Conventions when the 1967 War broke out.56 In paragraph 
91, the I.C.J. explicitly states that because Israel had ratified the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in 1951, it was a party to the Convention at the time 
of the war in 1967. Furthermore, the Court notes that the interpretation 
above “reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to protect civilians who find themselves…in the hands of the 
  
 55. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, Int’l Ct. of Justice, ¶ 177 (Jul. 9, 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. 
 56. Geneva Conventions of 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 31, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 75 
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occupying Power…regardless of the status of the occupied territories.” 
Therefore, the Geneva Convention applies to the West Bank and Israel 
must act consistently with the obligations of an Occupying Power 
therein.  
U.N. Security Council (U.N.S.C.) resolutions 446, 452, and 465 
condemn Israel’s policy of building settlements in the occupied 
territories, and the U.N.S.C. has taken the position that establishing 
settlements in the occupied territories constitutes a “flagrant violation” of 
the Convention.57 Furthermore, the I.C.J. concluded in its Advisory 
Opinion requested by the General Assembly that the “Israeli settlements 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have 
been established in breach of international law.”58 
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states, “Protected 
persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived…of the 
benefits of the present Convention…by any annexation by [the 
Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied territory.59 
Therefore, Israel is violating this provision if: 1) Palestinians are 
protected persons and 2) Israel has annexed the whole or part of the 
occupied territory.  
According to Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Palestinians 
are considered protected persons if they are “those who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a 
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”60 It has already been 
established that there is a conflict or occupation (see analysis above), so 
the remaining question is whether Palestinians are in the hands of a Party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. “The 
Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories are not Israeli citizens 
and cannot participate in Israeli national elections,” except for those 
living in annexed East Jerusalem who were offered Israeli citizenship if 
  
 57. S.C. Res. 446, available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/BA123CDED3 
EA84A5852560E50077C2DC. 
 58. In Advisory Opinion requested by U.N. General Assembly, International Court of Justice 
concludes that Jewish Settlements in the occupied territory are unlawful and that, despite Israel’s 
undoubted right of self-defense against terrorism, construction of wall on that occupied territory is 
violating customary international law and several conventions on human rights and humanitarian 




 59. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 21, at art. 47. 
 60. Id. at art. 4. 
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they renounced any other citizenship.61 Israel could argue that 
Palestinians are not protected people, because they have elected not to 
receive Israeli citizenship for political reasons. However, the PLO is a 
Party to this conflict and has been affirmed by Israel and the United 
Nations to be the official representative of the Palestinian people.62 
Furthermore, as referenced above, Palestinians in the West Bank under 
Area A are under the control of the PA. Thus, because Palestinians are “a 
people,” they are protected persons.  
With respect to annexation, the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly passed Resolution 2253 and Resolution 2254 deploring 
Israel’s de facto annexation of East Jerusalem and parts of the West 
Bank.63 Furthermore, newly elected UN Special Rapporteur Professor 
Richard Falk stated recently, “Israel is implementing a deliberate policy 
of forcing Palestinians out of their homes and off their land, in order to 
establish more illegal settlements and to proceed with the de facto 
annexation of the West Bank.”64 
By taking control of the West Bank, Israel had informally annexed East 
Jerusalem because that land was considered occupied land belonging to 
Jordan. Within the first ten years after the 1967 War, Israel “set up 
border-area settlements, called ‘nahalim,’ that were populated with 
young Israelis and were intended to help stem infiltration of Palestinian 
guerrillas and provide a first line of defense against conventional attack 
by Arab armies.”65 The areas where Israel established settlements include 
the highland ridges of the West Bank overlooking the Jordan Valley.66 
By deliberately establishing settlements in and around the perimeter of 
territories within the West Bank, Israel created a border of control within 
these areas to keep Palestinians out, thereby annexing these areas. The 
Israeli settlements (shown as small triangle shaped objects in the map) 
  
 61. George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories 528 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1994, 43 AMULR 467, available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1537&context=aulr. 
 62. G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX) [1974]; 3236 (XXIX) [1974]. 
 63. G.A. Res. 2253, available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/ 
A39A906C89D3E98685256C29006D4014; G.A. Res. 2254, available at http://unispal. 
un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3E28F2C76EBEA214852560DF00575C0E. 
 64. UN Special Rapporteur Condemns Israel of De Facto Annexation of the West Bank, THE 
ISRAELI COMMITTEE AGAINST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS (February 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.icahd.org/?p=8177. 
 65. Bisharat, supra note 61, at 531. 
 66. Ibid.  
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and settlement blocks (shown as non-uniform shaped masses in the map) 
in the West Bank can be seen in the map below.67 
In 1980, Israel 
passed a bill declar-
ing the Holy City 
of Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel, 
finalizing the uni-
lateral annexation 
of East Jerusalem – 




ther evidence the 
annexation of East 
Jerusalem, Israel 
provided Palestin-
ian residents living 
within East Jerusa-
lem the option to 
receive Israeli citi-
zenship as opposed 
to other Palestinian 
Arabs living in other parts of the West Bank who cannot attain Israeli 
citizenship even if they wanted it.69 
Israel may argue that it has not annexed all of the West Bank, as Area A 
is solely under PA control and the PA also has partial control of Area B. 
However, the provision does not require annexation of the entire 
occupied territory in order to establish a violation. Rather, annexation in 
“whole or part of the Occupied Territory” constitutes a violation of 
Article 47.70 Therefore, because Israel has annexed parts of the West 
  
 67. see Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, Key Maps, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/settlements_
checkpoints.stm. 
 68. Pierre Tristam, Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel: Legal Status or Illegal Occupation?, 
ABOUT.COM, http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/a/me081005g.htm. (last visited May 
30, 2013). 
 69. Bethany M. Nikfar, Families Divided: An Analysis of Israel’s Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel Law Para. 69 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Spring 2005), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ journals/jihr/v3/5/Nikfar.pdf. 
 70. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 21, at art. 47. 
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Bank and East Jerusalem, it is arguably in violation of Article 47 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.   
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contains two provisions 
pertaining to Occupying Powers that are particularly relevant to 
settlement expansionist activities conducted by Israel. The first relevant 
portion of the provision states, “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as 
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the 
territory of the Occupying Power…are prohibited, regardless of their 
motive.”71 Therefore, Israel is in violation of this portion of Article 49 if 
Israel conducts 1) Individual or mass forcible transfers or 2) deportations 
of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of Israel.  
In 1994, “the Civil Administration [of Israel] ordered the eviction of 
dozens of Jahalin [Palestinian Bedouin] families from land that was 
intended as a new settlement neighborhood” for the expansion of the 
Ma’ale Adumim settlement.72 The community decided to petition the 
Israeli High Court of Justice against the military order, because they 
refused to move out of their homes.  However, the Court denied their 
petition and by 1995, the Israeli army forcibly evicted the Jahalin from 
their homes and relocated them to a site next to the Jerusalem municipal 
garbage dump.”73 These acts of the Israeli government constitute a 
transfer, because Palestinians had to move from their established homes 
in the occupied territories to another area in the West Bank, the dump-
site. Furthermore, these transfers were considered mass transfers, 
because the 1995 transfer was followed by two more movements of other 
Jahalin families in 1997 and 1998 from their established homes to the 
same location.74 Finally, these can be classified as forcible transfers, 
because the Palestinians’ attempt to petition the Israeli HCJ evidences 
their clear intention not to leave their homes. The Palestinians ultimately 
moved, however, solely because their petition was denied and the Israeli 
army subsequently removed them from their homes.  
Israel insists that because the principle regarding individual or mass 
forcible transfers or deportations was drafted immediately following the 
Second World War, it is not relevant to the situation of the Palestinians. 
Israel contends, 
  
 71. Id.  
 72. Amnesty Int’l, Stop the Transfer: Israel About to Expel Bedouin to Expand Settlements 6 
(February 2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/001/2012/en/ 
0b66dcc1-bb09-4a0d-8560e10ac19f8f9e/ mde150012012en.pdf. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
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As International Red Cross’ authoritative commentary to the 
Convention confirms, the principle was intended to protect the 
local population from displacement, including endangering its 
separate existence as a race, as occurred with respect to the 
forced population transfers in Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Hungary before and during the war. This is clearly not the case 
with regard to the West Bank and Gaza.75  
Despite Israel’s contentions, this provision of Article 49 does indeed 
pertain to the situation of Palestinians, because the ICRC commentary of 
the provision indicates that it seeks to prevent “physical and mental 
suffering endured by these ‘displaced persons,’ among whom there were 
a great many women, children.”76 The broad and general purpose of 
Article 49 is to protect displaced persons, specifically women and 
children who may be affected by a transfer, and thus, the provision is not 
narrowly limited only to transfers resulting from World War II. 
Moreover, other international conventions designed to specifically 
protect victims of World War II, like the Refugee Convention, were 
limited temporally and geographically. Thus, in the absence of such 
restrictions, it stands to reason that the Article was intended to endure 
time and space. Therefore, Israel’s mass forcible transfers of Palestinians 
to other locations in the West Bank violates Article 49.  
The second relevant portion of Article 49 states, “[t]he Occupying Power 
shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies.”77 Therefore, Israel is in violation of this portion of 
the provision if they are deemed to have: 1) deported current occupants 
or 2) transferred parts of its own civilian population into the West Bank.  
Israeli settlements and outposts were established in the occupied 
territories with the intention to be inhabited by Jewish settlers.78 
According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, there are 
approximately 311,100 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and 
approximately 186,929 Israeli settlers living in East Jerusalem, in 
settlements or outposts.79 As of December 2011, there are over 124 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and approximately 100 outposts (not 
including East Jerusalem). Outposts are essentially Jewish settlements, 
but they are not recognized as settlements by the Israeli Ministry of the 
  
 75. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 20. 
 76. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 21, at art. 49. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Fact About Settlements, Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. 
org/jsource/Peace/ settlements.html. (last visited January 17, 2013). 
 79. supra note 47. 
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Interior, because Israel contends they were established by Israeli settlers 
allegedly without Israeli approval.80 While all settlements receive 
governmental support for infrastructure, construction, and establishment 
of public institutions,81 outposts “were built [by settlers] without 
government approval, without land being formally allocated, without an 
approved building plan, and in some instances on privately-owned 
Palestinian land.”82 However, like settlements, outpost “construction has 
been aided by the government and carried out with the knowledge of the 
military.”83 
Israel first began constructing settlements in 1948 and “until the end of 
the 1970s, the Government of Israel claimed that the settlements were 
established on the grounds of military necessity and security, [pursuant 
to Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention], but it has since 
abandoned this position.”84 With respect to settlements built after that 
time, Israel contends that each Israeli citizen decides privately, of his 
own free will, to move to the settlement, and therefore because the 
settlers’ movement is entirely voluntary, Israel is not in violation of this 
provision.85 However, the movement of settlers to the West Bank is not 
entirely voluntary, because the Israeli government has “implemented a 
vigorous and systematic policy to encourage [Jewish] Israeli citizens to 
move from Israel to the West Bank.”86 While the settlers still have the 
agency to reject such a move, the Israeli government is providing large 
incentives to impact their decision, making settler transfers not entirely 
voluntary. For example, these incentives include financial benefits to 
Jewish Israeli citizens and favoritism in the form of support granted to 
local authorities that serve settlements in the West Bank as opposed to 
settlements in Israel.87 
Additionally, Israel purports that the construction of settlements on 
seized land in the West Bank is justified by Israel’s law of eminent 
domain, which grants Israel an absolute right to do what it pleases with 
  
 80. B’TSELEM, supra note 38, at 37. 
 81. B’TSELEM, supra note 6, at 7. 
 82. B’TSELEM, supra note 38, at 39. 
 83. B’TSELEM, supra note 38, at 39.  
 84. Richard Goldstone, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict 47 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council A/HRC/12/48 (25 September 
2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-
48.pdf. 
 85. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 20. 
 86. Elisha Efrat, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of Occupation and 
Disengagement 38 (Routledge 2006).  
 87. Id.  
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its sovereign land.88 However, using Israel’s position that the West Bank 
is disputed territory and therefore not under the sovereign control of any 
State, Israel may not invoke the defense of eminent domain. By 
providing incentives for its Jewish citizens to leave Israel and move to 
settlements or illegally constructed outposts located in occupied territory 
of the West Bank, Israel is transferring parts of its civilian population 
and therefore, is in violation of this provision of Article 49.  
3. Application of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention  
Israel has not ratified either of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Convention.89 Therefore, Israel is not required to adhere to the provisions 
therein unless the Additional Protocols or any of their provisions have 
ripened into international customary law. While the Israeli government 
and some scholars contend that the additional protocols have not yet 
ripened into customary law, there has been significant international 
recognition that certain applicable provisions regarding the obligations of 
an Occupying Power have attained customary law status. Provision 4 of 
Article 85 of Protocol I Additional regards violations of Article 49 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention as grave breaches of the treaty.90 Provision 5 
in Article 85 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention deems 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or of this Protocol, war 
crimes.91 Therefore, because Israel is in violation of the provisions of 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (discussed above), Israel’s 
actions may be deemed war crimes if this provision has ripened into 
international customary law.  
For an international instrument to ripen into customary international law, 
opinio juris requires consistent action by states because those states 
believe there is a manner in which they are obligated to act.  The Israeli 
government and Professor Robbie Sabel of Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem contend that Protocol I has not attained customary law status.92 
However, “there has been international recognition that the concept of 
war crimes and grave breaches are applicable in internal, as well as 
international armed conflicts,” because this particular provision has 
  
 88. Ian Lustick, Israel and the West Bank after Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto 
Annexation 564 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL (Middle East Institute 1981). 
 89. Goldstone, supra note 84, at 72.  
 90. Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, Article 85(4) 
and 85(5), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Dr. Robbie Sabel, The Problematic Fourth Geneva Convention: Rethinking the 
International Law of Occupation, HEBREW UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW (July 16, 2003), available 
at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew120.php. 
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ripened into customary law.93 For example, “the ICTY and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have convicted individuals of 
committing war crimes in non-international conflicts” despite the treaties 
governing internal armed conflicts containing no grave breach 
provisions.94 Therefore, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention can 
amount to war crimes in customary international law. Under such an 
analysis, and assuming they are found in breach of Art. 49, Israel could 
conceivably be found guilty of not only grave breach, but war crimes as 
well. 
III. ARMED CONFLICT TO OVERTHROW A FOREIGN 
OPPRESSIVE REGIME IN THE NAME OF SELF-
DETERMINATION (CARS) 
A. CURRENT STATE OF ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIANS 
Although “the Geneva Conventions do not provide an authoritative 
definition of ‘armed conflict,’”95 persuasive authority established in the 
Prosecutor v. Tadic and Prosecutor v. Haradinaj cases decided by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Appeals Chamber provide a test and factors to determine the existence of 
an armed conflict. In Tadic, the ICTY generally explains, “an armed 
conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups.”96 The court then clarified in the Haradinaj case 
that this explanation for what constitutes an armed conflict may be 
understood as a two-prong test: 1) Conflict reaches a requisite level of 
intensity and 2) Parties to the conflict are organized.97 
According to the Haradinaj case, the Trial Chamber considered many 
factors to assess intensity including: 
number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the 
type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number 
and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of 
  
 93. GARY D. SOLIS,THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
WAR 99 (Cambridge University Press 2010).  
 94. Id. at 101. 
 95. Id.(citing Derek Jinks, “The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the ‘Global War 
on Terrorism,’” 46-1 Virginia J. of Int’l L. (2006), 1,20-1). 
 96. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgment), IT-94-1-A, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 Oct. 1995, para. 60.  
 97. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Trial Judgment), IT-04-84-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 3 April 2008, para. 38, 49-50.  
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forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the 
extent… of material destruction; and the number of civilians 
fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security 
Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.98 
During both Intifadas99 and still today, Palestinians have resorted to the 
use of arms to combat Israeli rule. For example, some have employed 
suicide bombers to target Israeli civilians in bus stations.100 The suicide 
bombings have taken place in Israeli cities including but not limited to 
Tel-Aviv.101 Israel has retaliated by initiating targeted killings of 
Palestinians suspected of terrorism in Gaza.102 Both the suicide bombings 
and the targeted killings have occurred in territories of a High 
Contracting Power, Israel. The intensity and duration elements of an 
armed conflict have been established by the fact that more than seventy 
suicide bombings since the first Intifada, all aimed at Israeli civilians, 
and the targeted killings sometimes result in destroying schools or homes 
in Gaza where the suspected terrorists are residing.103 
To elaborate on the second prong, the court states, “an armed conflict can 
exist only between parties that are sufficiently organized to confront each 
other with military means.”104 While “state governmental authorities have 
been presumed to dispose of armed forces that satisfy this criterion,” the 
organization of armed groups is not as clear-cut.105 Therefore, the court 
relies on several factors to determine when the organization criterion for 
armed groups is fulfilled, including the following:    
the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and 
mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; 
  
 98. Id. at para. 49.  
 99. Intifadas are known as the Palestinian and Arab violent uprisings directed at Israeli 
civilians beginning in late 1987 and continuing sporadically into the early 1990s. The uprisings 
manifested as suicide bombings of Israeli hotels, buses, and other public places and were exercised 
in protest against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
 100. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the 
Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/ 
Pages/Suicide%20and%20 Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.aspx. (last 
visited May 30, 2013). 
 101. Israel’s History of Bomb Blasts, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/middle_east/1197051.stm (last visited May 30, 2013). 
 102. Johannes Haushofer, Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/107/42/17927.full. 
 103. Katherine Iliopoulos, Israel Institutes Proceedings in Relations to Gaza War, CRIMES OF 
WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/israel-institutes-proceedings-in-relation-to-gaza-
war/. (last visited May 30, 2013).  
 104. Prosecutor, supra note 97, at para. 60.  
 105. Id. 
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the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of 
the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, 
recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and 
carry out military operations, including troop movements and 
logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use 
military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and 
negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace 
accords.106 
The second prong, whether the armed groups are sufficiently organized 
to confront one another with military means must be applied to both 
Israel and the Palestinians. Israel meets the second prong, because there 
is a presumption that State governmental authorities have the requisite 
level of organization.107 Therefore, the question is whether Palestinians 
can meet the criterion of an organized armed group. As mentioned 
above, the PA has control of Area A and partial control of Area B, so this 
fact speaks to the factor delineated above regarding the group’s control 
over a certain territory. Also, the PLO has the Palestinian Liberation 
Army (PLA) and the PA has the Palestinian Security and Police Forces, 
both of whom give the Palestinians the ability to gain access to weapons, 
other military equipment, recruits, and military training.108 Finally, the 
PLO’s actions during the Oslo Accords and subsequent attempts to 
negotiate peace agreements and cease-fires reflect its ability to speak 
with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire 
or peace accords. Therefore, Palestinians are sufficiently organized to 
establish the second prong. 
Next, according to Tadic, “International humanitarian law applies from 
the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of 
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case 
of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.”109 Any 
intermittent temporary cease-fire agreements during the conflict were 
just that, temporary, and therefore they did not bring military operations 
to a close in these regions. Thus, although the suicide bombings or 
targeted killings may not necessarily be taking place at this very moment, 
international humanitarian law still applies to this conflict and it is 
characterized as a current armed conflict, because no peace has been 
reached yet.  
  
 106. Prosecutor, supra note 97, at para. 70.  
 107. Prosecutor, supra note 97, at para. 60.  
 108. PLO-PA Comparison Chart, PROCON.ORG, http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/ 
view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=904. 
 109. Prosecutor, supra note 96, at para. 70.  
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Therefore, an armed conflict currently exists between Israel and the 
Palestinians, because as discussed above, the requisite level of intensity 
has been met by the amount, duration, and type of violence exchanged, 
both parties are sufficiently organized to confront each other with 
military means, and no final peace agreement has been reached yet. 
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CONFLICT AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED  
1. Conflict under CARS 
Despite some evidence to characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
State v. State armed conflict, the overwhelming evidence indicates that 
the conflict is an international armed conflict in self-determination to 
overthrow an oppressive regime – or CARs (colonial domination, alien 
occupation, racist regime, self determination). Specifically, the General 
Assembly, Security Council, and the International Court of Justice have 
affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.110 Dr. 
Christian Nwachukwu Okeke, Professor of Law and Director of the LLM 
and SJD International Legal Studies Programs at Golden Gate University 
clarifies and eloquently proposes that “the essential consideration is 
whether the demand of a given people or nation to assert their right of 
declaring the nature of their socio-political status is basically recognized 
and encouraged.”111 Thus, based on Dr. Okeke’s approach, Palestinians 
have a right of self-determination, because the U.N.G.A., U.N.S.C., 
I.C.J., and majority of member States in the U.N. basically recognized 
and encouraged the Palestinian right of self-determination via 
resolutions, opinions, and approval of the Palestinian bid for statehood, 
respectively.  
Breaking down the analysis further, one can establish an armed conflict 
in the name of self-determination if there are a people who are fighting in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination. However, it should be 
noted that the term “people” has not been precisely defined.112  
Nevertheless, a San Francisco based attorney who practices human rights 
and humanitarian law full time, Karen Parker, provided a definition of 
“people” at her Presentation to the First International Conference on the 
Right to Self-Determination in Geneva in August 2000. She asserts that 
for a people to possess the right of self-determination, they must have: 1) 
a history of independence or self-rule in an identifiable territory 2) a 
  
 110. Advisory Opinion, supra note 55.  
 111. OKEKE, supra note 44, at 116.  
 112. Reference RE Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
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distinct culture and 3) a will and capability to regain self-governance.113 
Finally, self-determination emanates from some type of foreign 
occupation. Because Israeli occupation over the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories (specifically the West Bank for the purposes of this paper) has 
been established above, this element need not be discussed further.  
First, although the Palestinians do not have a history of independence, 
since they did not adopt or implement the Palestinian Mandate, they do 
have self-rule in an identifiable territory. For example, as discussed 
previously, the PA has sole control over Area A and partial control of 
Area B in the West Bank. This control of the PA is likely sufficient 
control for the purposes of self-rule, because it would not seem 
reasonable for self-rule to be as high a standard as forming a 
government.114 Furthermore, the West Bank is an identifiable territory; it 
has been recognized as such by the United Nations in various 
resolutions,115 by the United States in The World Factbook,116 by the 
Israeli Government who refers to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria,117 
and by the international community. Therefore, the Palestinians are self-
ruled by the PA in the identifiable territory, the West Bank. 
Second, the Palestinians have a distinct culture, because they share a 
common cultural foundation. For instance, the majority of Palestinians 
share a common religion, Islam, and they also speak the same language, 
Arabic.118 These characteristics are wholly different from a large majority 
of the population of Israel who are Jewish and speak Hebrew.119 Thus, 
Palestinians have a distinct culture. 
Third, the history of Palestinians and the goals of the PA reflect that 
Palestinians have a will and capability to regain self-governance. Since 
the establishment of the state of Israel, Palestinians have had the will to 
govern themselves as demonstrated by their attempts to establish a 
Palestinian State in the territories they deem to be their homeland. For 
example, with respect to the Partition Plan of the UNGA, the 
  
 113. Karen Parker, Presentation to First International Conference on the Right to Self-
Determination United Nations, ASSOCIATION FOR HUMANITARIAN LAWYERS (August 2000), 
available at http://www.guidetoaction.org /parker/selfdet.html. 
 114. Again, because no law has provided a precise definition of a “people,” various 
interpretations are up for debate. 
 115. G.A Res. 3236 (XXIX) [1974]; see also supra note 55. 
 116. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 47. 
 117. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Judea and Samaria, (January 1, 2004), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Judea+and+Samaria.htm. (last 
visited May 30, 2013). 
 118. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 47. 
 119. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 47. 
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“Palestinians considered the proposal unrepresentative of the 
demographic distribution of Jews and Arabs living in Palestine at that 
time, and so rejected it,” because they wanted to establish Palestine in a 
larger territory.120 Therefore, although they rejected the recommendation, 
they did so to ensure future establishment of a Palestinian homeland that 
would encompass all the territories to which they felt entitled.  
Because all three elements have been satisfied, the Palestinians are a 
people who may exercise their right to self-determination. Therefore, 
there is a strong argument and international support that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is characterized as a CARs armed conflict in the 
name of self determination. The IHL-LOAC instruments that apply to 
this type of characterization are all four Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, but because the 
provisions applying to an Occupying Power have been discussed above, 
the provisions discussed below will not include those detailing the 
obligations of an Occupying Power. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION WHERE 
ISRAEL IS NOT DEEMED TO BE AN OCCUPYING POWER 
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that unlawful 
deportations or transfers of persons protected by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention are deemed grave breaches. Thus, Israel’s actions may be 
deemed a grave breach if the settlement expansionist efforts have led to 
the unlawful transfer of protected persons.121 Because Jahalin Bedouins 
are Palestinians, Palestinians are protected persons, and the transfer of 
the Jahalin Palestinians has already been established (see above), the 
issue is whether this article would still apply to Israel not deemed an 
Occupying Power and whether the transfer is unlawful. The ICRC 
commentary indicates this provision refers to breaches of Articles 45 or 
49 and Article 45 is not a provision that deals with the obligations of an 
Occupying Power. Therefore, Article 147 applies. The ICRC 
commentary also indicates that transfer is not unlawful “in cases where 
the safety of the protected persons may make them absolutely 
necessary.”122 
Jahalin have been transferred to an area in Jerusalem near the municipal 
dumpsite. Some Israeli officials have tried to argue that they were 
transferred for their own protection. However, Israel admitted that the 
  
 120. PUBLIC BROADCAST STATION, supra note 8, at 2.  
 121. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 21. 
 122. ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600169?OpenDocument. 
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reason for the transfer was to expand the Ma’Aleh Adumim Settlement 
Bloc.123 Moreover, “settlers in the nearby settlements consistently harass 
the Bedouin communities and attack their property with virtual 
impunity.”124 For example, settler attacks against Palestinians have 
included: destroying olive trees and other Palestinian personal property, 
throwing rocks at Palestinians, gunfire, assault, forcing Palestinians off 
their land, making threats, theft of crops, and torching of fields.125 “From 
September 2000 to the end of 2011, B’Tselem submitted 352 complaints 
to the Israel Police” and in the same time period, B’Tselem submitted 57 
complaints of incidents in which it was suspected that security forces 
stood idly by during acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians.126 
Therefore, the transfer is unlawful because it was clearly done for 
expansion purposes and not for the protection of the Jahalin; instead of 
ensuring the safety of Palestinians, the Israeli Police has actually allowed 
violence against Palestinians to occur with impunity. As a result, Israel’s 
actions of wrongfully transferring Jahalin Palestinians may amount to a 
grave breach. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since 1967, Israel has engaged in operations to construct and expand 
settlements for Jewish Israeli citizens. As part of the expansionist efforts, 
Israel has demolished Palestinian homes and structures to accommodate 
the construction of settlements and roads to connect them. These 
demolitions have led to the forcible transfer of Palestinians to other parts 
of the Occupied Palestinian Territories as well as to transfer parts of its 
civilian population from Israel to the occupied territories of the West 
Bank. As a result of Israel’s construction of settlements and expansionist 
efforts, Israel is in violation of International Humanitarian Law – Laws 
of Armed Conflict including the Fourth Geneva Convention, Protocol II 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and Common Article 3.  
While it is necessary to recognize and address the potential obstacles to 
peace in order to validate the struggles of the conflict, a holistic approach 
to the conflict also requires a robust discussion of the work being done 
on both sides to promote peace. This shift in the discourse on Israel and 
Palestine is necessary to assure Palestinians and Israelis that there is a 
partner for peace and to educate the international community about how 
peace and change can be accomplished.  
  
 123. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 72, at 3. 
 124. Id. 
 125. B’TSELEM, supra note 38, at 44. 
 126. Id. 
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PART TWO – METHODS OF NON-VIOLENCE AS PROGRESS 
TOWARD A LASTING RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the Israeli government and Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) entered into peace agreements known as the Oslo Accords in 1993 
and resumed peace talks in 2000, they proved unsuccessful. However, 
much work has been done on the ground with Palestinians, Israelis, and 
interested communities in the Diaspora to make progress towards peace; 
these grassroots efforts have not received the proper recognition and 
support they deserve. It is my contention that – like the women’s rights 
movement and movement for LGBT equality in Israel – a lasting peace 
and holistic approach to conflict resolution between Israelis and 
Palestinians can only come from a revolution inspired by the people. 
Such a movement would then serve as a catalyst for agreements between 
the governments to ensue. It is vital for Palestinians, Israelis, and the 
international community to be aware of and engage in the peacebuilding 
efforts on the ground. 
Part one needs to be followed by a discussion of grassroots efforts. 
Working on the ground with everyday people is vital to the promotion of 
understanding on both sides. It fuels the momentum of populace-based 
movements, builds consensus on the terms of a peace agreement, and 
mobilizes the current governments to sincerely negotiate with one 
another to end the conflict. It follows that a discussion of the conflict is 
incomplete without education about the presence of non-violence, as it is 
an essential piece to peacebuilding and making progress toward 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Education about existing 
grassroots organizing is therefore necessary to validate our past, accept 
our present, and make strides towards how we envision the future 
between Israel and Palestine – one of a lasting and sustainable peace. 
Section II highlights several grassroots organizations engaged in various 
non-violent peacebuilding methods. It will discuss how these diverse 
methods of non-violence, particularly when taken in conjunction with 
one another, are a necessary component for making progress toward 
ending the conflict. Section III illuminates the importance of emigrant 
community involvement and Section IV provides specific information 
about how to get involved in the grassroots, non-violent movement 
toward a lasting peace in Israel and Palestine. Part V concludes that 
methods of non-violence are an essential piece to a lasting peace in Israel 
and Palestine. 
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II. METHODS OF NON-VIOLENCE UTILIZED BY 
GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE A NECESSARY 
COMPONENT OF PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION. 
Various methods of non-violence are being utilized by various grassroots 
organizations working diligently and constructively to build peace and 
make progress toward ending the conflict. The methods of non-violence 
necessary to make progress towards achieving a lasting peace include: 
dialogue and reconciliation, utilization of media, public education, 
political outreach and advocacy, parallel programs in Palestine and Israel 
to build consensus, “constructive unilateralism,”127 youth leadership 
programs, education of and involvement of the Diaspora, and coalition 
building across community lines. Each one of these methods of non-
violence will be represented and carefully articulated by the work of the 
following organizations: The Parents Circle, Combatants for Peace, 
OneVoice, Seeds of Peace, Shatil of the New Israel Fund, and Blue 
White Future. However, for non-violent methods to be successful, there 
must be widespread education about the non-violent movement, so that it 
may gain momentum through public education about and accessibility to 
these methods.  
A. THE PARENTS CIRCLE – FAMILY FORUM (PCFF) 
“The Parents Circle - Families Forum (PCFF) is a joint Palestinian-
Israeli organization of over 600 families, all of whom have lost a close 
family member as a result of the prolonged conflict.”128 The PCFF 
conducts face-to-face Reconciliation Programs, public and media 
activities, and member activities. 
1. Dialogue and Reconciliation 
As part of the face-to-face Reconciliation Program, “every year, 
members of the Parents Circle meet over 30,000 youth and adults – 
Israelis and Palestinians”129 to share their personal narratives about losing 
their family member(s) to the conflict and to emphasize the joint 
message of reconciliation.130 “These meetings convey a message of 
  
 127. Constructive Unilateralism is a term coined by Blue White Future, a non-partisan political 
movement based in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Israel; see http://bluewhitefuture.org/the-new-paradigm-2012/.  
 128. The Parents Circle – Family Forum, Introduction, http://www.theparentscircle.org/ 
Content.aspx?ID=2#.UKmFcOOe8s0. (last visited November 29, 2012). 
 129. The Parents Circle – Families Forum, Video Gallery, http://www.theparentscircle.org/ 
VideoGalery.aspx. (last visited November 30, 2012).  
 130. The Parents Circle  - Families Forum, Dialogue Meetings, http://www.theparentscircle.org/ 
Content.aspx?ID=9#.UKmrQOOe8s0. (last visited November 30, 2012). 
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dialog [sic] and the possibility of reconciliation” as an alternative to 
violence.131 Consequently, the audience members listening to the 
narratives will likely identify with the Israeli or Palestinian PCFF 
member who shares a similar story to them. Because the Israeli and 
Palestinian members are sharing their narratives in the same physical 
space, alongside one another, the audience members will also hear the 
stories of the other side in a potentially non-threatening way.  Thus, with 
the clear objective of sharing their narratives, the PCFF members are 
able to demonstrate “an understanding of the needs of the other” to the 
audience.132 
2. Media Outlets as Education and Counter-Narratives for Non-
Violence 
Utilizing media on an even larger scale, the PCFF spreads the message 
beyond its own membership that reconciliation is possible and a 
prerequisite to achieving a sustainable peace. For example, PCFF created 
“Good Intentions” – a TV drama series about a Palestinian and an Israeli 
woman who worked together on a cooking show. They develop a strong 
connection despite their respective families’ strong disapproval of their 
jobs in working with “the enemy.”133 The series “seeks to show the 
humanity of both sides…of the conflict through the experiences of 
[these] two women.” Using fictitious characters based on real stories, it 
demonstrates that the conflict is not as black and white as our collective 
consciousness allows us to believe.134 Art has a very real impact on how 
we view ourselves and people in communities different from our own. 
Thus, by providing Palestinian and Israeli women and girls with a 
character they can identify with, the show has the potential to inspire 
people to see themselves having positive interactions with those deemed 
to be the enemy.  
More recently, PCFF released the film, “Two-Sided Story,” which 
“documents the reactions when Israelis and Palestinians from different 
generations, backgrounds and political persuasions meet, talk, and get to 
know each other as human beings.”135 The twenty-seven Israeli and 
Palestinian participants in this dialogue workshop in the Palestinian city 
of Beit Jala included: “Bereaved families, Orthodox Jews and religious 
  
 131. The Parents Circle – Families Forum, supra note 129. 
 132. The Parents Circle – Families Forum, supra note 130. 
 133. Sara Sorcher, Finding Peace Through Food & Entertainment, ABC NEWS (25 July 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=5448893&page=1#.UKomKeOe8s0. (last visited May 
30, 2013). 
 134. Id. 
 135. United States Institute of Peace, PeaceMedia, http://peacemedia.usip.org/resource/trailer-
two-sided-story-%E2%80%93-parents-circle-families-forum. (last visited May 30, 2013). 
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Muslims, settlers, ex soldiers in the Israeli army, ex security prisoners, 
citizens of the Gaza strip, kibbutz members, second generation holocaust 
survivors, non violent activists and more.”136 This film reveals that it is 
possible “to acknowledge the story of ‘the other,’ to show empathy and 
to express a desire for reconciliation.”137 
Television and film are easy ways to disseminate information to large 
audiences and shape the way we view the conflict. Media largely focuses 
on the violence of the conflict— arguably to boost ratings —and in doing 
so, further fuels feelings of anger and division amongst involved groups 
of the conflict. At the very least, television and films about the peaceful 
aspects of the conflict are imperative to creating a balance. Media 
outlets, such as those employed by PCFF, reveal an alternative to 
violence. Notably, those people most negatively impacted by the conflict 
are successfully utilizing it. The more wide-reaching non-violent media 
becomes, the greater chance it will have of influencing the way people 
conceive of and engage with the conflict. 
Admittedly, the number of Palestinians engaged in dialogue and 
reconciliation in the last few years has decreased significantly due to the 
financial crisis, fatigue, and anti-normalization campaigns.138 Some 
Palestinians and radical activists are adamantly opposed to efforts of 
dialogue and reconciliation, because they “perceive activities that [do 
not] challenge the occupation directly as normalization, or acceptance of 
the status quo.”139 
However, members of this anti-normalization movement are missing the 
point. No method alone, violent or non-violent, can directly change the 
status quo overnight. Change comes gradually by both direct and indirect 
means that work together to transform the minds of the involved parties. 
The fact that Combatants for Peace, a dialogue and reconciliation based 
organization has “maintained a steady level of activity over time” shows 
that minds are being transformed and the non-violent method of dialogue 
and reconciliation is making progress.140 
  
 136. Parents Circle – Family Forum, Two-Sided Story, http://www.theparentscircle.com/ 
Twofaces_en.aspx?ID=50#.UKoumeOe8s0. (last visited November 30, 2012). 
 137. Facebook event initation, http://www.facebook.com/events/384381641618546/. (last 
visited August 22, 2013). 
 138. Ophir Bar-Zohar, Peace Activists are sick of talking about soccer, HA’ARETZ (25 April 
2012), available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/peace-activists-are-sick-of-talking-about-
soccer-1.426396. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
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Without the dialogue and reconciliation effort, the non-violent movement 
would have had no platform on which to discuss more non-violent 
methods to challenge the status quo. To overcome the barriers of 
changing the status quo, dialogue and reconciliation efforts must be 
exercised and vigorously coupled with, political outreach and advocacy, 
public education, and utilization of other non-violent methods. However, 
to quash the dialogue and reconciliation efforts altogether would unravel 
the non-violent movement and undo the progress made toward ending 
the conflict. Human connection is the foundation of the non-violent 
movement and the driving force motivating and uniting the people to 
challenge the status quo. 
B. COMBATANTS FOR PEACE (CFP) 
Combatants for Peace (hereinafter CFP) is a movement jointly started by 
Palestinians and Israelis who formerly partook in violence within the 
conflict, but who have since abandoned their violent means and forged a 
united front to achieve a just resolution to the conflict via dialogue and 
reconciliation. Their shared vision for a lasting and fair resolution to the 
conflict is “to terminate the Israeli occupation, to halt the settlement 
project and to establish a Palestinian state with its capital in East 
Jerusalem, alongside the State of Israel.”141 CFP seeks to raise 
consciousness about the suffering of both sides, “to educate toward 
reconciliation and non-violent struggle in both [societies],” and to place 
political pressure on both Governments by operating in the following 
ways: 
• To continue with the combatants’ meetings, which allow 
each side to understand the other’s narrative, via the 
approach of reconciliation rather than conflict. 
• To implement an educational lecture series in public 
forums on both sides (universities, youth groups, schools 
etc.). The lectures will be given jointly by an Israeli and 
a Palestinian veteran, who will concentrate on the 
transition from violent struggle to the recognition of the 
limits of violence… 
• To set up Bi-National media teams which will act in 
order to influence public opinion in Israel, Palestine and 
the rest of the world. 
  
 141. Combatants for Peace, About, http://cfpeace.org/?page_id=2. (last visited May 26, 2013).  
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• To participate in demonstrations and other non-violent 
actions against the occupation as a bi-national group.142 
1. Dialogue and Reconciliation and Public Education 
Combatants for Peace utilizes dialogue and reconciliation, public 
education, and political outreach and advocacy as methods of non-
violence to make progress toward resolution of the conflict. A theme that 
permeates throughout the personal stories of former vets on the website 
is that dialogue and reconciliation allow for mutual understanding.143 
This theme is significant because mutual understanding yields validation 
of both sides. This validation has resulted in a personal transformation of 
the most violent people in the conflict to believe that non-violence is a 
necessary step in making progress toward peace and resolving the 
conflict.144 
The implementation of lectures adds a layer of public education to the 
dialogue and reconciliation method. Educating the public with a united 
front of historically opposed former violent extremists is a showing of 
solidarity. This solidarity promotes compassion and understanding in the 
audience because they can identify with the representative of their 
nation. By instilling compassion and understanding in the audience, CFP 
has used a combination of dialogue and reconciliation and public 
education to inspire a transformation in the audience. Alternatively, CFP 
at the very least has provided the audience with a reason to explore 
dialogue and reconciliation as a method of non-violence toward ending 
the conflict.  
The dialogue and reconciliation method has had success within this 
organization and in separate armed conflicts. In a different conflict, an 
organization called Conciliation Resources launched a Dialogue Series in 
2011 to play a part in reaching a peace agreement on 7 October 2012 
between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). This agreement “[signaled] an end to more 
than four decades of armed conflict in Mindanao.”145 The dialogue and 
reconciliation efforts used in this instance are examples of when non-
violence methods yield effective results and positive change. 
  
 142. Id.  
 143. Combatants for Peace, Personal Stories, http://cfpeace.org/?cat=6. (last visited May 24, 
2013).  
 144. Id.  
 145. Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/resources/historic-agreement-paves-way-
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In the Israeli-Palestinian context, the dialogue and reconciliation efforts 
within CFP have stopped the cycle of violence between some of the most 
egregious offenders in the conflict: former Israeli soldiers who illegally 
attacked and killed Palestinian civilians and Palestinians who attempted a 
suicide bombing. These changed Israelis and Palestinians have been 
working together to promote a message of non-violence that will 
transform the minds of the people into wanting to end the conflict using 
non-violent means.  
2. Political Outreach and Advocacy 
In addition, Combatants for Peace supplements its dialogue and 
reconciliation and public education efforts with political outreach and 
advocacy. For example, CFP representatives regularly meet with 
ministers and political parties to promote non-violent positions within the 
political scene. On the Palestinian side, members of the movement have 
met the President Mr. Mahmoud Abbas twice and a third meeting is 
planned in the near future.”146 Unlike some political activists who 
demonstrate against Israel or Palestinians for the sole purpose of 
protesting, CFP actually uses the momentum of its demonstrations to put 
pressure on political leaders. This pressure is more effective than blind 
protesting, because CFP is intentional in selecting its audience and is 
coming from a place of compassion rather than from attacking its 
audience. 
However, as will be discussed in section C below, no political pressure is 
seemingly strong enough to sway the current Israeli Government or the 
Palestinian Government in Gaza - Hamas; they have made it clear, 
especially during the recent violence, that they have no intention of 
pursuing negotiation peace talks or resolving the conflict. Rather, under 
these circumstances, more drastic measures must be taken – there must 
be a collective transformation of people’s minds so that the change 
comes from a revolution of the people. 
While revolutions often entail violence and chaos, the revolution I am 
referring to is one of progress through calculated and intentional non-
violence, inspired by a ground swell of the population to make social and 
legal changes. This ground swell of progress through the use of non-
violence is not a new concept to Israeli culture or history. 
  
 146. Combatants for Peace, Projects, Meetings with Ministers and Political Parties, 
http://cfpeace.org/?cat=7&story_id=873. (last visited November 12, 2012). 
34
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 19 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/8
2013] HOLISTIC APPROACH TO CONFLICT 139 
In fact, the women’s movement in Israel had a recent legal victory due to 
the tenacity and bravery of women committed to change and equality. 
Previously in Israel, women were legally forbidden from wearing 
tallitot147 and tefillin while praying at the Western Wall, a holy site for 
the three major monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Tallitot and Tefillin are religious garb that ultra-Orthodox Judaism 
reserves for only men to wear. Ultra-Orthodox Judaism also forbids 
women to read from the Torah (Jewish Bible) out loud in front of male 
congregants. During prayer, men and women are forbidden from sitting 
together, and are thus divided into two sections – male and female – 
separated by a barrier. Pursuant to this rule, a separation barrier is in 
place at the Western Wall, but there is no designated area for differing 
religious observers to pray at the Western Wall in accordance with their 
own customs.  
On December 1, 1988, the “first International Jewish Feminist 
Conference [was] held in Jerusalem,” where “one hundred Jewish 
women gather[ed] for a prayer service and Torah reading at the Kotel,” 
many of them wearing a prayer shawl or tallit.148 Although the women’s 
service was held in the back of the women’s section, away from the 
ultra-Orthodox observers,149 ultra-Orthodox men and women at the site 
became enraged and disrupted the women’s service, verbally and 
physically assaulting the women for disobeying ultra-Orthodox customs. 
However, these women, who began a coalition called the Women of the 
Wall, continued their Torah reading out loud, exercising their right of 
religious freedom on a regular, monthly basis.150 
In response, Israel codified the ultra-Orthodox customs into law on 
December 31, 1989. As a result and on many occasions, Israeli police 
detained and arrested women praying at the Western Wall for wearing 
tallitot and tefillin; the arrests were based on the charge that the women’s 
religious customs were disturbances to the public order.151 However, in 
spite of the law and opposition by the ultra-Orthodox faction in Israel, 
the Women of the Wall maintained their strong conviction of religious 
gender equality, filing numerous petitions and appeals with the Israeli 
  
 147. Tallitot is the Hebrew word for prayer shawls and the singular term is tallit.  
 148. Women of the Wall, History, http://womenofthewall.org.il/about/history/. (last visited May 
27, 2013).  
 149. Marcy Oster, Women Should Not Have Been Arrested at Western Wall, Judge Rules, JTA 
(April 25, 2013), http://www.jta.org/2013/04/25/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/women-should-
not-have-been-arrested-at-western-wall-judge-rules. (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 150. Women of the Wall, supra note 148.  
 151. Id. 
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Supreme Court and continuing their monthly Torah service at the 
Western Wall.152 
Recently, on 25 April 2013, “the Jerusalem District Court [ruled]… that 
customs change and women should not be arrested for wearing prayer 
shawls at the site.”153 Also in April 2013, “an envoy appointed by Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu…proposed adding a mixed-gender section 
for non-Orthodox denominations of Judaism,” so that they would be able 
to observe their religious customs at the Western Wall as well.154 
Additionally, the LGBTQ movement in Israel has followed a similar 
trajectory of starting out with groups of advocates whose voices gained 
momentum and ultimately resulted in concrete law and policy changes. 
A significant portion of activism began in media and popular cultural 
events. In 1993, the Israeli TV network, Arutz 2, began to regularly 
dedicate air-time to LGBTQ social and political topics.155 “In 1997, 
Education Minister Zvulun Hammer sought to ban an Educational 
Television program on homosexual teenagers. The Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, joined by several gay rights organizations, petitioned the 
High Court to overturn Hammer’s decision,” and the “Court ordered 
Hammer to permit the program to be aired.”156 In 1998, despite violent 
protests by the conservative right, annual gay pride parades began to take 
place in Israel. By 2006, Jerusalem served as host to the World Pride 
Festival.157 
Within less than a decade, these types of civic engagement and activist 
campaigns around LGBTQ issues began to generate enough political 
pressure and will to change laws and policies in Israel. Example changes 
include recognition of gay marriages performed abroad in 2006158 and 
  
 152. Id.  
 153. Jewish 'Women Of The Wall' Plan Further Court Battles Over Prayer Rights At Western 
Wall, REUTERS, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/28/women-of-the-wall-_n_3173669.html. 
(last visited May 28, 2013). 
 154. Id.  
 155. LEE WALZE, BETWEEN SODOM AND EDEN: A GAY JOURNEY THROUGH TODAY'S 
CHANGING ISRAEL 151 (2000). 
 156. GaytlvGuide, Significant Dates and Developments, http://www.gaytlvguide.com/start-
here/gay-rights-in-israel. (last visited May 28, 2013). 
 157. Michael T. Luongo, Jerusalem Hosts World Pride, THE WORLD CONGRESS OF GAY, 
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER JEWS, http://www.glbtjews.org/ 
article.php3?id_article=205. (last visited May 28, 2013). 
 158. Ruth Eglash, Jerusalem Registers Its First Gay Couple, JPOST.COM, 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Jerusalem-registers-its-first-gay-couple (2007). (last visited May 28, 
2013). 
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application of the Law of Return to the non-Jewish gay husband of an 
immigrant.159 
While the fight for women and LGBTQ equality in Israel is far from 
over, the leaps and bounds that Israel has made regarding these issues is 
derived from the commitment and fervor of grassroots organizations and 
ordinary Israeli people non-violently fighting for equal rights. From the 
example of these two Israeli movements, it becomes clear that political 
pressure must come from a larger scale, collective transformation of the 
people. That transformation can be achieved via parallel programs in 
Israel and Palestine, uniting the ordinary people on both sides to elect 
respective governments that reflect their true desires for peacebuilding 
and negotiations. 
C. ONEVOICE  
OneVoice is “an international grassroots movement that amplifies the 
voice of mainstream Israelis and Palestinians, empowering them …to 
forge consensus for conflict resolution and build a human infrastructure 
capable of mobilizing [themselves] toward a negotiated, comprehensive 
and permanent agreement between Israel and Palestine.”160 OneVoice has 
four programs including: OneVoice Israel, OneVoice Palestine, 
OneVoice Europe, and OneVoice International. Engaging its many 
programs, OneVoice utilizes various methods of non-violence, such as 
crafting parallel programs in Israel and Palestine to build consensus, 
holding youth leadership programs, doing political outreach, and 
educating the Diaspora. 
1. Parallel Programs in Israel and Palestine to Build Consensus 
OneVoice Israel and OneVoice Palestine have parallel programs for each 
of its own populations to build consensus on what each side needs to 
resolve the conflict peacefully. The nature of these parallel programs is 
to appeal to each side’s national self-interests in order to build a solid 
consensus. According to OneVoice, “progress at the negotiating table is 
only one step in the process of reaching an agreement that can be 
implemented. An end to the conflict will only come when the leaders 
come to an agreement that their peoples are ready to understand, accept, 
  
 159. Raphael Ahren, Ministry Grants Citizenship to Gay Spouse of Immigrant, HAARETZ, 
available at http://www.haaretz.com/weekend-/anglo-file/ministry-grants-citizenship-to-gay-spouse-
of-immigrant-1.382066 (2011). 
 160. OneVoice, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/. (last visited November 14, 2012). 
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and support.”161 Thus, the first step to reaching an agreement is 
consensus regarding the needs of each side.  
In 2009, OneVoice administered a “Public Polling” phase to find out 
what the Palestinian and Israeli public cares most about and the people 
would like to see included in a final agreement.162 In addition to eliciting 
the core issues and positions of the Israeli and Palestinian populations, 
“thoughtful polling [was] used to engage and inform ordinary people, 
highlight existing agreement, bolster moderate views, expose extreme 
positions, and ultimately build consensus and even peace.”163 The public 
polling phase, therefore did “not merely gauge public opinion, 
but [engaged] the public in crafting consensus on the issues at the heart 
of the conflict.”164  
According to the polling phase conduct by OneVoice, the top twelve 
most urgent issues for Palestinians (from most urgent to least) are:  
1. Establishing an independent sovereign state of Palestine (97%) 
2. The rights of refugees (95%) 
3. Agreement on the future of Jerusalem (94%) 
4. Agreement on managing Holy sites (91%) 
5. Security for Palestine (90%) 
6. Settlements in the Occupied Territories/West Bank (89%) 
7. Rights to natural resources (88%) 
8. Agreeing on borders for Israel and Palestine (77%) 
9. Peace between Israel and the Arab World (35%) 
10. Peace between Israel and Lebanon (31%) 
11. Peace between Israel and Syria (30%) 
12. Security for Israel (21%)165 
The top twelve most urgent issues for Israelis are:  
1. Security for Israel (77%) 
2. Agreement on the future of Jerusalem (68%) 
3. Rights to natural resources (62%) 
4. Agreement on managing Holy sites (57%) 
5. Agreeing on borders for Israel and Palestine (49%) 
  
 161. OneVoice, Programs, Public Polling, http://onevoicemovement.com/programs/polling.php 
(emphasis added). (last visited May 30, 2013).  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. OneVoice, Programs, Part 1. The Shape of an Agreement, 
http://onevoicemovement.com/programs/polling_part1.php#substance. (last visited May 30, 2013).   
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6. Peace between Israel and Jordan (47%) 
7. Peace between Israel and Egypt (46%) 
8. Peace between Israel and the Arab World (37%) 
9. Peace between Israel and Lebanon (36%) 
10. Peace between Israel and Syria (36%) 
11. Establishing an independent sovereign state of Palestine (33%) 
12. Settlements in the Occupied Territories/West Bank (33%)166 
Although what is the most urgent issue for one group is not the top issue 
for the other, it is profoundly noteworthy that each side is concerned 
about the top twelve urgent issues of the other side in some capacity. 
Specifically, the polling phase revealed that the vast majority 
(approximately 75% of each side) of Palestinians and Israelis would 
accept a two state solution as a basis for a peace agreement.167 These 
results were then analyzed and prepared into a report, but more 
importantly they were used as a basis from which to launch and inform 
the next phase, Town Hall Meetings.168 
Once the poll results were gathered, OneVoice held town hall meetings 
to convert the outreach from individual level engagement of the 
peacebuilding process to that of a community level engagement.169 These 
meetings served to “surface issues and break taboos, while building 
understanding that ending the conflict, ending the occupation, ensuring 
security, and achieving a two state solution is possible.”170 
Building national consensus about what each side wants is imperative to 
resolution of the conflict, because the consensus can inform the content 
and structure of a peace agreement. The content and structure of the 
peace agreement can then be used as a framework for the government to 
engage in negotiations. With a growing civilian interest in pursuing 
where each side’s national self-interests overlap, the people of the 
conflict will have the opportunity to put pressure on the government to 
enter into negotiations or elect officials to government who reflect the 
people’s desire for peace and negotiation.  
An example of the changing consciousness of the Israeli people was the 
Israeli audience’s positive reaction to President Obama’s recent address 
  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. OneVoice, supra note 161. 
 169. OneVoice, Programs, Breaking Taboos, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/programs/ 
town_hall.php. (last visited November 16, 2012).  
 170. Id. 
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in March 2013.171 Despite President Obama making some less than 
traditionally conservative statements, him and his speech were received 
very well by the young Israelis. For example, when Obama stated that 
peace is necessary, and security for Israel is not possible without “the 
realization of an independent and viable Palestine,” the audience gave 
President Obama a standing ovation.172 Obama also stated, “the 
Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determination, their right to justice, 
must also be recognized,” and his words were met with cheering and 
applauding by the Israeli audience.173 Finally, Obama adamantly asserted, 
“Israelis must recognize that continued settlement activity is 
counterproductive to the cause of peace,” and again, the Israeli audience 
responded with clapping and unwavering support.174 The positive 
reaction of Israelis to President Obama’s speech is a testament to the fact 
that more Israelis share these progressive views about peace than the 
media leads us to believe; change is happening. 
When people change their minds, they elect officials who reflect their 
beliefs and put pressure on their current elected officials to make tangible 
strides toward changing the status quo. As mentioned above, it is clear 
that neither the Israeli Government nor the Palestinian elected 
government in Gaza seem interested in resuming peace talks or resolving 
the conflict. Violence has escalated by both Hamas and the Netanyahu 
government, and Netanyahu’s continual expansion of settlements on 
what will eventually be part of the Palestinian State are an obstacle to 
peace that undermines a two-State solution.  
However, the Israeli reaction described above is not just a spectacle; the 
change in Israeli consciousness is having a real impact. This shift that 
Israelis are moving in a more progressive direction was evident in the 
most recent Israeli elections held in late January 2013. The far right wing 
electoral alliance, Likud Beiteinu headed by Netanyahu, won far less 
seats in the current Israeli Parliament, decreasing dramatically from 42 
down to 31 seats.175 Replacing those seats is a growing centrist party 
  
 171. Grace Wyler, Obama Just Finished His Speech In Israel, And People Are Already Saying 
He Made History BUSINESSINSIDER (March 21, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-
israel-speech-2013-3. (last visited May 28, 2013) (President Obama spoke to an audience of Israelis 
in Jerusalem, most of whom were university students. It should be noted that Jerusalem is one of the 
most religious and politically conservative cities in Israel.) 
 172. Erin Delmore, Obama to Young Israelis: ‘You are not alone,’ MSNBC, 
http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/03/21/watch-live-president-obama-speaks-to-israelis/. (see video at 27:55) 
(last visited May 28, 2013). 
 173. Id. (see video at 31:44). 
 174. Id. (see video at 39:27). 
 175. Harriet Sherwood, Binyamin Netanyahu suffers setback as centrists gain ground in Israel 
election Results give narrowest of victories to the prime minister's rightwing-religious block, THE 
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known as “Yesh Atid,” meaning “there is a future” in Hebrew, who 
received 19 seats, and the third largest contingency is the Labour party 
with 15 seats.176 “Erel Margalit of Labour said the results indicated ‘a 
protest vote against Netanyahu’ and that the huge social justice protests 
that swept Israel 18 months ago ‘were not a fringe phenomena. Perhaps 
some of it is moving from the streets into the political arena.’”177 
While the far right still has the most seats, this move towards the center 
is a reflection of the changing nature of the Israeli consciousness. This 
changing Israeli consciousness has been prompted by the more 
progressive contingency and is likely (at least in part) a result of the 
positive methods of non-violence. Thus, to unite the ordinary people of 
Palestine and Israel to elect new governments or sway their current 
elected officials, the movement needs youth leadership programs, 
education programs in the Diaspora, political outreach advocacy, and 
coalition building across community lines. 
2. Youth Leadership Program  
The OneVoice Youth Leadership Program is run on two separate tracks – 
OneVoice Israel and OneVoice Palestine. OneVoice Israel conducts 
lectures on Israeli university campuses about the OneVoice movement 
and holds initial training seminars to teach youth leadership skills. It also 
holds an advanced seminar to designate OneVoice Ambassadors the 
“responsibility and reward of representing the Movement before different 
audiences – on a college tour, in Town Hall Meetings, in meetings with 
supporters and donors oversees, or at events with groups from abroad.”178 
These lectures and seminars then prepare the youth to become OneVoice 
Trainers who “[represent] the Movement at conferences and events” 
including “being interviewed as spokespersons for OneVoice in print and 
broadcast media, joining delegations to the World Economic Forum, and 
meeting with dignitaries on behalf of the Movement.”179  
OneVoice Palestine also has a training program, which has been 
completed by 1,500 youth activists spanning across 8 West Bank cities 
and has developed a pilot program for youth in Gaza. OneVoice 
Palestine 
  
GUARDIAN, (January 23, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/22/israel-elections-
binyamin-netanyahu. (last visited February 20, 2013).  
 176. Id.  
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 178. OneVoice, OneVoice-ISRAEL, http://onevoicemovement.com/programs/onevoice-
israel.php. (last visited May 30, 2013).  
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[supports] the youth leaders in planning and implementing youth 
initiatives that serve their communities and help spread the 
OneVoice message and recruit new members. The purpose of 
these activities is to empower [their] youth leaders, give them 
more responsibility, strengthen their relationships with their local 
communities, and promote OneVoice as a real grassroots 
movement interested in civic engagement180 
These Israeli and Palestinian parallel youth programs strengthen the 
respective national communities and create a united front on each side. 
By creating a united a front, OneVoice is ensuring that the people on 
each side stay engaged in the end goal, resolution of the conflict. 
Furthermore, the existence of these parallel programs provides each 
group with the reassurance that when the people are ready, there is 
someone to talk to and negotiate with on the other side.181 
3. Education Programs and Political Outreach in the Diaspora 
OneVoice Europe and OneVoice International Programs engage the 
people living outside of Israel and Palestine, including students and 
political leaders in the UK and US. As part of the International Education 
Program, OneVoice organized tours for Palestinians and Israelis living 
the conflict everyday to interface with, and provide a better 
understanding to, their families, friends, and supporters abroad. “The 
program shares the reality on the ground with American, Europeans and 
many other international audiences, and offers them the opportunity to 
experience the conflict through the eyes of ordinary Israelis and 
Palestinians who work tirelessly to achieve Middle East peace.”182 In the 
United States alone, “more than 19,000people have attended OneVoice 
regional tour events on over 100 U.S. university campuses and 
community centers.”183 
OneVoice Europe initiated political outreach and education programs to 
address the Anti-Israel and Anti-Palestinian communities in Europe who 
were increasingly taking extreme positions and further polarizing the 
conflict.184 “In 2011, OneVoice Europe launched a new Outreach and 
Education Programme [sic] that continues the work [done in Israel and 
  
 180. Id. 
 181. OneVoice, About OneVoice, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/about-onevoice/ 
activities.php. (last visited May 30, 2013). 
 182. OneVoice, Programs, OneVoice INTL, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/programs/ 
onevoice-international.php. (last visited May 30, 2013).  
 183. Id. 
 184. OneVoice, Programs, OneVoice EUROPE, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/ 
programs/onevoice-europe.php. (last visited May 30, 2013).  
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Palestine] on university campuses in the form of conflict resolution 
training sessions and student support.”185 The “Outreach and Education 
Programme” is: 
a future-focused initiative, engaging its participants in forward-
thinking dialogue about solutions, rather than backward-looking 
debate about historical narratives. Its potential to build bridges 
between communities, empower moderate students, and promote 
conflict resolution is powerful and unique, involving members of 
British, Palestinian, and Israeli society from many faiths and 
backgrounds.186 
Community and university leaders meet for “an in depth conflict 
resolution and leadership training session, with the aim of empowering 
them to carry on such discussion activities and to continue promoting a 
transformation of attitudes within their own communities.”187 This 
education model is imperative to non-violently combat the anger and 
hatred incited by the media. It provides a constructive way for the 
international community to engage in what ordinary Palestinians and 
Israelis really want – peace.  
OneVoice Europe has also reached out to the political community by 
organizing meetings with the Right Honorable David Miliband Foreign 
Secretary and by liaising with former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the 
Quartets representative to the Middle East. Additionally, OneVoice 
Europe has successfully organized a rally in Parliament square “attended 
by over 300 members of the public and 30 parliamentarians” to demand 
that the OneVoice principles be used going forward and to prioritize the 
conflict and future negotiations.188 Thus, political outreach has allowed 
“grassroots to be heard at the highest level of the international 
community.”189 
Recently “in 2011, Shadow Middle East Minister Stephen Twigg 
commended [OneVoice’s] work to the House of Commons, calling on 
the Foreign Secretary William Hague to join him in recognizing the 
movement and its achievements.”190 International political involvement is 
yet another way for the international community to constructively engage 
in promoting negotiations to end the conflict. Political advocacy is also 
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another powerful tool that can be used to spread information about 
methods of non-violence. In addition to the separate youth programs in 
Israel and Palestine and education of youth and students abroad, it is 
important to engage the youth of Palestine and Israel in a coexisting 
environment so that they can develop positive associations with one 
another and share that experience with the older generations. 
D. SEEDS OF PEACE 
Seeds of Peace is a non-profit organization that conducts a three-week 
intensive conflict resolution program for youth ages 14-16 from regions 
of conflict. The children (also known as “Seeds”) coexist in a camp in 
Maine, United States and engage in “hours of discussion guided by 
professional facilitators” to “confront each other directly over their 
competing historical narratives and share their personal experiences of 
the conflict.”191 After “the Seeds have reached new thresholds for 
understanding perspectives,” they return to their respective homes. At 
home, the organization provides year round local programs for the 
graduates to ensure their continual development as effective peace 
builders.192 “Seeds of Peace offers more targeted programs and advanced 
skills training as alumni move into their university years and begin their 
careers, leveraging their unique relationships, understanding, and skills 
to shift the landscape of conflict and peace in the Middle East.”193 
Youth programs do not just promote education and understanding 
amongst the young, but also help bridge the older generations to the 
younger progressive movements. While older generations are more likely 
to have stories of pain and suffering that have been compounded by time 
and anger, the younger generation has had less time to process and 
internalize their stories of pain and loss into deeply imbedded hatred. 
Children are resilient; they have more energy, more free time, and a more 
probable chance of mustering enough forgiveness to work towards a 
resolution in comparison to their older counterparts. Thus, the younger 
generation that is exposed to and generally more inclined to progressive 
thinking can and likely will have a transformative impact on older 
generations.194 
  
 191. Seeds of Peace, International Camp, http://www.seedsofpeace.org/?page_id=770. (last 
visited May 30, 2013). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Seeds of Peace, Middle East Programs, http://www.seedsofpeace.org/?page_id=1252. 
 194. See Welsh-Huggins, Personal ties can change gay marriage attitudes, FOXNEWS.COM  (12 
May 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/12/personal-ties-can-change-gay-marriage-
attitudes/. (last visited May 30, 2013).   
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In line with this thought, the younger the children involved in these 
programs, the sooner they will be exposed to a positive interaction with 
their alleged enemy and the better chance that they will have to work 
through any pain and suffering caused by the conflict. The sooner young 
children have these interactions and engage in conflict resolution work, 
the more likely it is that when and if they do experience loss and pain, 
they will still pursue methods of non-violence to resolve the conflict, 
because they have the most to lose if the status quo is maintained. The 
inherent intergenerational work accomplished by youth programs ensures 
long lasting progress toward peace efforts. Young people involved in the 
program feel a sense of empowerment and responsibility, which will 
inspire them to transform the minds of their parents and to carry on their 
activism into their adult life. 
E. SHATIL OF THE NEW ISRAEL FUND 
Creating coalitions across community lines, Shatil of the New Israel 
Fund bridges existing gaps between Israeli civilians and non-Jewish 
Arabs living within the borders of Israel.  
Shatil was founded by the New Israel Fund to help build and 
strengthen civil society in Israel. [They] work for social change 
together with activists, organizations, networks, grass-roots 
groups and social movements in Israel and worldwide. [They] 
aspire toward a society based on equality of all citizens and 
residents of Israel – a society that believes in the principles of 
social, economic and environmental justice and works to achieve 
them; a society that promotes human and civil rights, respects 
religious and cultural differences, and recognizes the importance 
of shared society.195 
Shatil has various initiatives working on a myriad of aspects in Israeli 
civil society, including: twenty-two (22) religious and feminist 
organizations working against the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere, The Umbrella Forum for Bedouin Education, The Coalition 
against Immigrant Under-employment, and Yachdav for the Prevention 
of Violence in the Ethiopian Family, to name only a few.  
To promote a unified Israeli society, Shatil has a “Shared Society” 
initiative, which “is working to establish a society in which all groups 
feel a sense of belonging and shared ownership – facilitating Arab-
  
 195. New Israel Fund, Shatil, Shared Society, http://www.shatil.org.il/english/change/shared-
society/. (last visited June 29, 2012). 
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Jewish dialogue and joint action to address the root causes of conflict, 
alleviate tensions and develop interim and long-term solutions.”196 Shatil 
utilizes strategic tools and methodologies to accomplish this goal, 
including 1) “Formation and capacity-building of Arab-Jewish 
leadership groups to effect change 2) Consulting and training of 
activists and organizations in the use of constructive tactics 3) 
‘Workplace Dialogue,’” which creates a safe space for the “facilitation of 
Arab-Jewish dialogue groups in institutions, enterprises and 
organizations to advance equality in workplace policies and practices197 
and 4) Leadership training “for creating new visions and the practical 
skills to mobilize and implement them.”198 
The various programs and initiatives of Shatil serve the vast diverse 
population within Israel, which allows for coalition building across 
community lines. These human connections between different and 
historically opposed communities will strengthen the collective Israeli 
identity to be one that is inclusive of people from all ethnic backgrounds 
and religions. In turn, this inclusivity will promote understanding, 
internal peace, and a solid core for making progress toward peace with 
Palestinians. 
F. BLUE WHITE FUTURE (BWF) 
Utilizing the methods of non-violence discussed above establishes a 
strong foundation of political activism, creates consensus for the goal of 
two separate states, and builds momentum for constructive change and 
progress toward peace negotiations. Blue White Future (hereinafter 
BWF) employs this momentum by promoting a process called 
constructive unilateralism – “a move by either party that helps to further 
the achievement of two states.”199 According to BWF, constructive 
unilateralism “is in line with the two-state vision as described in the 
many blueprint proposals for a two state solution” and “a constructive 
unilateral move will not become an obstacle once the parties resume 
negotiations.”200 An example of constructive unilateralism was the Israeli 
disengagement from Gaza in 2005. Accordingly, BWF urges the Israeli 
Government and the Palestinians to take measures of constructive 
  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (“An example of this mediated intervention is [their] successful on-going program with 
the professional and administrative staff at the multicultural Safed College.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. White Paper – A New Paradigm for the Israeli-Palestinian Political Process:Promoting 
Two States for Two People via Constructive Unilateralism with International Support, The New 
Paradigm 2012, BLUE WHITE FUTURE (January 6, 2012), available at http://bluewhitefuture.org/the-
new-paradigm-2012/. 
 200. Id.  
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unilateralism even before peace negotiations occur to aid that process.201 
Thus, “the underlying principle of the new paradigm calls for 
gradually creating a reality of two states by performing a series of 
gradual constructive unilateral steps.”202 
The most obvious next steps for the Israeli Government are to halt 
construction and expansion of settlements in the West Bank and to 
“enact a law that allows for voluntary evacuation, compensation and 
eventual absorption of settlers presently residing [within the Occupied 
territory of the West Bank], to encourage settlers who wish to relocate” 
to Israel proper.203 BWF also insists “Israel should prepare a national plan 
for the absorption of the settlers who would relocate to Israel proper, 
whether before or after an agreement is signed.  Such a plan should have 
urban, vocational, social, psychological and other appropriate 
components” to compensate these settlers.204 “According to recent polls, 
nearly 30 percent of [the] 100,000 settlers [living in the Occupied West 
Bank] would accept compensation and quickly relocate into Israel 
proper.”205 Therefore, taking the constructive unilateral step to assist 
those settlers who voluntarily wish to leave the settlements would be a 
feasible process with incentives and compensation and not similar to the 
arguably traumatic disengagement of Gaza in 2005.206 
The next step for the Palestinians is to halt all acts of violence and 
terrorism against the State of Israel and its residents. The various 
Palestinian Governments, but mainly Hamas, must unilaterally cease any 
and all acts of violence and take measures to stop their own Palestinian 
citizens from engaging in any violence or acts of terrorism. However, 
constructive unilateralism should not only be reserved to Israel and 
Palestine. The international community has more resources to assist with 
these processes, and therefore should contribute as well.207 
  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Gilead Sher, Op Ed: Steps Israel Should Take to Control its Destiny, BLUE WHITE FUTURE 
(October 11, 2012), http://bluewhitefuture.org/news-category/news/. (last visited January 11, 2013).  
 206. Id.  
 207. While eventual dismantling of the settlements is a necessary step to make progress towards 
peace and will probably be a condition to the peace negotiations, this process and how to achieve 
complete settlement disengagement for the settlers who do not wish to leave voluntarily is in and of 
itself likely not considered a non-violent procedure. Therefore, it is outside the scope of this paper. 
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III. WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR US ABROAD? 
Although the aforementioned methods of non-violence are actively being 
utilized by a myriad of non-profit organizations, the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict is still underway because there is not enough media attention, 
education about the non-violent movement, or access to information 
about how to get involved. Therefore, it is no surprise that the people’s 
collective consciousness about the conflict has not yet been transformed 
and more work must be done to that end.  
Simply put, it is in the global interest as well as in the national self-
interest of Americans to get involved in securing a peace agreement 
between the Israeli and Palestinian Governments. The international 
community and the U.S. cannot afford to financially support a conflict 
that is unsustainable. On the international front, many surrounding Arab 
nations provide weapons and military contributions to Hamas, further 
perpetuating the cycle of violence. Instead, this aid should be provided in 
the form of resources, such as food, water, education, and health 
assistance. If the neighboring States are really concerned with the plight 
of the Palestinian people, then their contributions should be geared 
toward the prosperity of the people, not the destruction of Israel. 
Similarly, U.S. tax money goes toward providing arms to the Israeli 
military, so the U.S. can and should use this fact to leverage a peace 
negotiation.  
Like any armed conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has created 
negative environmental repercussions that have a global effect.208 Thus, 
the international community and can and should get more involved in the 
conflict to address and ideally prevent these environmental harms from 
occurring. Finally, all first-world superpower States with a lot of 
privilege and pull in the U.N. should put at least some of their resources 
into achieving peace if for no other reason than to bolster international 
security, and thereby national security.  
According to OneVoice: 
Israelis and Palestinians equally share the role and responsibility 
to propel their leaders toward the two-state solution that resolves 
all final status issues and establishes an independent Palestinian 
state, based on the borders of 1967, at peace with Israel. This can 
  
 208. Eugenia Ferragina, The Effects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on Water Resources in 
the Jordan River Basin, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, available at 
http://www.globalenvironment.it/ferragina.pdf. 
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only be achieved if the international community embraces its 
role, helping realize the vision of the movement through 
constructive engagement and action.209 
The international community has an ethical obligation to Israel, 
Palestine, and its respective people to engage in peacebuilding efforts 
that promote negotiations. International direct engagement and activism 
to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may help bridge gaps between 
communities abroad. These historically polarized and unaffiliated groups 
may even develop a holistic approach to conflict resolution that can be 
applied in all international political spheres. 
IV. HOW CAN WE BECOME INVOLVED? 
The first and most important way to get involved is to get educated about 
the non-violent work being done. The second and easiest way to get 
involved is to donate money to any one or more of the organizations 
committed to ending the conflict in a non-violent way. The third way to 
get involved is to write letters to senators, congressman, and the 
president to request that they prioritize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
promote negotiations between both governments. The fourth and most 
rewarding way to get involved is to check out the links below and attend 
a local program, become an active member of an organization committed 
to non-violent work, volunteer in an internship, engage in community 
work regarding this or any other conflict, and/or practice any one or 
more of the methods of non-violence. 
Name of Organization Websites Regarding Specific Ways to Get Involved  
Parents Circle Family Forum http://theparentscircle.com/MalingList.aspx 
Combatants For Peace http://cfpeace.org/?page_id=123# 




New Israel Fund  http://www.nif.org/get-involved 
Israel Palestine Center for 
Research and Information 
http://www.ipcri.org/IPCRI/Get_Involved.html 
If we in the Diaspora are truly concerned with achieving a lasting and 
just peace in Palestine and Israel, we must seek out information about 
this movement, instead of being victims to the only aspect of the conflict 
  
 209. OneVoice, supra note 182.  
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that the media seeks to portray which are violence and destructive 
criticism.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The status quo in Israel and Palestine is not sustainable. The escalating 
violence and current governments of both sides are a reflection of the 
people’s omnipresent fear of the other side. However, we do not have to 
sit idly by. Dialogue and reconciliation are the first steps to peacefully 
combating fear, because they promote understanding. Understanding will 
inform counter narratives of the conflict like non-violence and 
peacebuilding. Non-violence will be echoed in and utilized by media to 
educate the public. Educating the public will inspire political outreach 
and advocacy. Political activism will strengthen parallel programs in 
Palestine and Israel that build consensus among the people. Youth 
leadership programs can further bolster consensus among the people, 
because youth play a part in transforming the minds of the older 
generations and collective consciousness. Education about consensus 
reached in Palestine and Israel must reach the Diaspora so the Diaspora 
can do its part to support the consensus with constructive unilateralism to 
end the conflict. The non-violent movement in Palestine, Israel, and 
abroad will inspire coalition building across community lines 
everywhere. Finally, when the people are provided with the tools and 
resources to work with one another on a grassroots level, they will be 
united to change the status quo. They will both elect new governments 
that share their beliefs and desires for peace and resolution to the conflict 
or put pressure on current governments to resume and conclude final 
peace negotiations. This transformation of the government and people 
using methods of non-violence is an essential piece to a lasting peace in 
Israel and Palestine. 
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